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“Spies All Their Lives”:
African Americans and Military
Intelligence During the Civil War
Carly S. Mayer
In December 1863, an Irish-born Confederate officer of
the Army of Tennessee concluded that only one measure could
possibly save the slaveholders’ republic. Major-General Patrick
Cleburne, panicking about the sequence of devastating defeats
suffered by his army, proposed that the Confederacy arm and
emancipate its slaves. Such an assertion from a southern senior
military officer was astonishing, to say the least. The Confederacy
went to war to preserve the institution of slavery and to defend its
right to exist as the only independent slaveholding republic.1 Yet,
Cleburne’s memorandum starkly revealed the reality of the war—
that slavery was no longer the “great…truth” that Confederate
Vice President Alexander Stephens had claimed it to be in March
1861.2 Over the course of the struggle, Cleburne insisted, the
institution of slavery had become one of the Confederacy’s
“chief sources of weakness.”3 Although Cleburne’s proposal
was never adopted, his core contention highlighted the immense
threat enslaved African Americans posed to the embattled
Confederacy.
In the address to his fellow officers, Major-General
Cleburne recounted the humiliating circumstances of the
Confederacy during the war. “Every soldier in our army already
knows and feels our numerical inferiority to the enemy,” he
affirmed, and, “if this state continues much longer we must
be subjugated.” Moreover, Cleburne identified “the three
great causes operating to destroy us,” specifically, numerical
inferiority of southern troops, inadequate supplies, and, most
shockingly, the increasing military cost of slavery.4 He explained
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that slaves worked actively against the Confederacy, serving as
an “omnipresent spy system” and deterring Southerners from
fighting Union troops because they had to ensure that their slaves
were “not free to move and strike like the enemy.”5 Because of
slavery, Cleburne affirmed, the South was forced to wage war
“with the Union army in front and ‘an insurrection in the rear.’”6
Slaves had become, in every sense, “the enemy within.”7
Even prior to Cleburne’s realization of slaves’
contributions to Union military intelligence, southern planters
and military officials recognized the immense problem of slave
allegiance. Planters routinely complained about their slaves’
insubordination, unsure of how to control the restive population.
These planters feared that slaves were endlessly assisting Union
officials throughout the South, posing an acute threat to the
Confederacy that was seemingly impossible to halt. From the
civilian viewpoint, slaves, who were “absen[t] of the political ties
of allegiance,” were utterly undermining the Confederacy; they
had indeed become the Confederacy’s “most vulnerable point.”8
The reality was undeniable—enslaved, escaped, and
freed African Americans greatly assisted the Union war effort.
This thesis aims to uncover the military and naval intelligence
contributions of African American men and women during
the American Civil War (1861-1865). In particular, it focuses
on why and how African Americans participated in clandestine
activities—what made them excellent scouts and guides, how
they contributed in Union campaigns, and the means they used
to undermine the Confederacy on its plantations and in its
households.
The independent slaveholding republic fell victim not
just to Union forces but also, significantly, to the determined
resistance of its enslaved population. The Confederacy’s fleeting
existence demonstrates that, in so many ways, human chattel
made history: they cemented the destruction of the Confederacy
and the institution of slavery. War transformed enslaved men
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and women into the “enemy within” that the Confederate South
was simply unable to suppress.
In May 1861, Union Major General Benjamin Butler
occupied Fortress Monroe, Virginia, which served as an
important staging ground for naval operations and intelligencegathering activities along the coastlines of the Carolinas. Beyond
its strategic significance, Fortress Monroe served as the grounds
where Butler and the region’s slaves forged the first alliance
between the Union Army and the South’s enslaved population.
Butler recognized that fugitive slaves possessed exceptionally
valuable information regarding Confederate activities and a
superior understanding of local southern terrain.9 Accordingly,
he deployed fugitives’ talents against the Confederacy.10 When
Butler was transferred from Fortress Monroe to the Department
of the Gulf in early 1862 to lead “the land forces destined to
cooperate with the Navy in the attack upon New Orleans [in
Louisiana],” he knew that slave military intelligence would again
play a critical role.11 Thus, Butler recruited Abraham Galloway, a
fugitive slave and northern spy, to assist in the perilous campaign.
This was far from Galloway’s first Union intelligence
task. In April 1861, by the recommendation of abolitionist
George Stearns, Massachusetts’s war leaders recruited Galloway
to serve as a spy in the Confederacy.12 Galloway did not stumble
upon the Union camp in his attempt to escape the South nor did
he beg for admittance into the camp as a safe haven; rather, in
all certainty, he was sought after to participate in the northern
intelligence network.13 Galloway routinely aided in Union military
operations, traveling extensively behind enemy lines and risking
his life infiltrating unfamiliar southern plantations.
The logic behind Galloway’s recruitment was seemingly
incontrovertible. Who better to stealthily blend into Confederate
society than a black man born and raised in the South? Who
more adept to penetrate the Confederacy than an ex-slave
who previously escaped to the North? And yet, Galloway’s
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recruitment to the Union intelligence network marked one of
the first instances that Union military leaders recognized the
potential of slaves to undermine the Confederate war effort.14
At the start of the American Civil War, President
Abraham Lincoln and the federal government were politically
committed to defeating the South, irrespective of slavery.15 In
his proclamation on April 15, 1861, President Lincoln promised
“to avoid any destruction of, or interference with, property,”
namely slavery.16 “Certain it is that the Republicans…are ‘no
friends of slavery,’” Treasury Secretary Samuel Chase assured a
prominent Kentuckian, “but it is just as certain that they have
never proposed to interfere…with slavery in any State.”17 Thus,
the fluid relationship between Galloway and Butler would not
have been feasible in most Union commands.18 That spring, the
prevailing military opinion was that a northern victory should
pose no threat to the rights of southern slaveholders to hold
African Americans in bondage. A few days after Butler occupied
Fortress Monroe, for instance, Major General George B.
McClellan, later commanding field general, reassured Virginia’s
Unionists that he would not confiscate their slaves. Indeed,
McClellan promised to fight “for my country and the Union, not
for abolition…” and to “crush any attempt at insurrection.”19
Abiding by this sentiment, Union forces routinely vowed that
they would not interfere with southern property, most essentially
slavery, upon attacking the South.20
Accordingly, when Major General Butler encountered
slaves entering Fortress Monroe, he specifically labeled them
“contraband of war” to obliterate any obligation to return them
to slaveholders who claimed them as property.21 If his troops
had acquired a Confederate wagon or mule, would they have
contacted their rightful owners to return them? In reality, the
Union troops simply would have put the acquired resources
to good use. Thus, while Butler’s use of the term “contraband
of war” was loose, his argument made logical sense. When he
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justified his decision to the Union War Department, President
Lincoln deemed it unobjectionable. In early August 1861, the
United States Congress formulated the general principle into
The First Confiscation Act, which ordered the forfeiture of any
slaves utilized in direct assistance to the Confederate war effort.22
This resolve was directly tested at the end of August 1861, when
Major General John C. Frémont, Commander of the Western
Department, exercised stern measures to suppress guerrilla
activity.23 On August 30th, he declared martial law throughout
Missouri, mandating, “the court-martial and execution of all
persons taken with arms in their hands within Union lines.”24 As
a way to punish those who abetted southern partisans, Frémont
ordered the property of active dissenters confiscated and their
slaves declared free, asserting that the proclamation was of
military necessity. President Lincoln contested the order, stating
that the permanent future condition of slavery “must be settled
according to laws made by law-makers, and not by military
proclamations.”25 Frémont was thereby instructed to rescind
the emancipation provision. Accordingly, Butler’s “contraband”
order and Frémont’s unsuccessful proclamation determined the
limits of acceptable military interference with slavery during the
first years of the American Civil War.26
Growing recognition of fugitive slaves’ military value,
specifically of their local knowledge and their experience to
spy, scout, or guide Union troops, slowly eroded the policy
of exclusion. Yankee Colonel Simon H. Mix of the 2nd New
York Cavalry attested to their importance in assisting military
expeditions into Confederate territory. “In all our expeditions in
North Carolina we have depended upon the negroes as guides,”
Mix claimed, “for without them we could not have moved with
any safety.” He was particularly grateful for slaves’ guidance in
the Low Country, as “nowhere in the swamps of North Carolina
can you find a path where a dog can go that the negro does
not understand.”27 “Upwards of fifty volunteers of the best and
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most courageous,” reported Vincent Colyer, superintendent
of the poor in New Bern, North Carolina in 1862, “were kept
constantly employed on the perilous but important duty of
spies, scouts, and guides.”28 In these tasks, Colyer recounted,
slaves barely escaped with their lives, as they were pursued on
several occasions by bloodhounds and taken as prisoners.29 He
affirmed that African American operatives were “invaluable and
almost indispensible [sic]” and “frequently went from thirty to
three hundred miles within the enemy’s lines” to “bring back
important and reliable information.”30 Such accounts confirmed
that many Union leaders had begun to recognize the advantages
and the value of slaves’ intelligence.
In March 1862, Congress instituted The Act Prohibiting
the Return of Slaves, which barred Union soldiers from returning
fugitive slaves to their owners. The new article undermined the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850—which legally required all runaway
slaves to be returned to their masters—and marked a turning
point in federal policy.31 In April 1862, Major General Abner
Doubleday’s instructions to Colonel J.D. Shaul, Commander
of the 46th New York Infantry, cited the new article of war in
requiring his troops to treat fugitive slaves “as persons and not
as chattels.” “Under no circumstances has the commander of
a Fort or camp the power of surrendering persons claimed as
fugitive slaves as this cannot be done without determining their
character,” Doubleday affirmed. When asked by the commander
if it would be better to exclude fugitive slaves altogether from
Union lines, Doubleday responded, “…they bring much valuable
information which cannot be obtained from any other source.
They are acquainted with all the roads, path fords and other natural
features of the country and they make excellent guides. They
also know and frequently have exposed the haunts of secession
spies and traitors and the existence of rebel organization. They
will not therefore be excluded.”32
A July 1862 article in the Chicago Tribune cemented this
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opinion, advocating for an “immediate alliance with the slaves
of rebels” as they were the most versatile guides, a sort of “live
map.”33 The article continued:
Oh, how must the Genius of rebellion have
grinned, from her outlook, at the misguided
wandering in an unmapped wilderness of
an army of invasion! Maps! Useless works
of the engineering art, when negroes, live
maps, that could see, and walk, and talk,
and point with the index finger—crowds
of them—stood expectant within reach of
our army, and hungered and thirsted to be
employed to conduct us to the enemy by
the driest and best paths—maps capable of
leading us, with unerring certainty, through
the woods to the lowest and weakest parts
of the line of entrenchments the rebels had
thrown up…aged maps, sold from plantation
to plantation, through the Peninsula, and
familiar from ancient coon-hunting, and still
persistent night wandering, with every road
and swamp in it…would have led our army
right up to the places of weakness…I knew
108,000 men in April last who, under such
guidance and such God-speed, would have
stormed the gates of hell.34
The Chicago Tribune reporter, like Doubleday, promoted the
Union’s collaboration with slaves in gaining military intelligence.
Many Union military officials, however, resisted utilizing
slaves in their military campaigns. “Not all Union officers
welcome blacks into their lines,” explained Captain C.B. Wilder,
Superintendent of Contrabands at Fortress Monroe, as “many
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were suspicious of the abandoned and self-liberated slaves.”
These officers “lacked a forthright commitment to emancipation”
and “placed a higher value upon potentially loyal slaveholders
than upon demonstrably loyal slaves.”35 Specifically, Major
General Don Carlos Buell, Commander of the Army of Ohio in
Kentucky, sought to exclude all slaves from Union lines despite
the fact that slaves provided “in every case the most reliable
as well as important information of the rebel movements” to
officers in Kentucky and Tennessee. In April 1862, the Chicago
Tribune reported that Major General Buell received “the means of
detecting officers and spies lurking in Nashville [in Tennessee],”
critical information that enabled him “to nip a conspiracy in the
bud and prevent an insurrectionary movement.” Nonetheless,
Buell denied the intelligence of slaves, “…a people who are
naturally enemies to those who hold them in bondage.”36
Yet, other Union military officials quickly learned the
value of African Americans’ willingness to provide intelligence
and became staunch opponents of proslavery military policies.
Initially, like most Union generals at this pre-emancipation stage
of the war, Major General Ormsby M. Mitchel, commander
of a division of the Army of Ohio, did not encourage slave
rebellion. He scrupulously conformed to Buell’s orders regarding
fugitive slaves. However, Mitchel’s subordinates denounced
such obedience. One commander of an Ohio regiment offered
his resignation in protest against Mitchel’s order–issued at the
express direction of Buell–to expel fugitive slaves from the
camps of their division. Characterizing the order as “repugnant
to my feelings as a man,” the officer threatened to abandon his
service if forced to obey it. Although only a few other officers
and enlisted men took such a principled stance, several faulted
Mitchel for “inconsistency in regard to the eternal negro
question.”37 Their resentment toward Buell’s solicitude for the
rights of slaveholders, and of Mitchel’s subservience to Buell,
was made blatantly apparent.38
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Military circumstances prompted Mitchel to dissociate
himself from Buell’s policy though. In late March and early April
1862, as the majority of Buell’s army moved southwest from
Nashville to join the other western armies at Pittsburg Landing,
Tennessee, Mitchel’s division marched south toward Huntsville,
Alabama, in the heart of the Tennessee Valley plantation district.
Deep in enemy territory and attempting to guard several hundred
miles of railroad and river, Mitchel depended on slaves for
information about Confederate concentrations and movements.
“With the assistance of the Negroes in watching the River,”
Mitchel expressed, “I feel myself sufficiently strong to defy the
enemy.” He later revealed that African Americans were “our
only friends” and that “in two instances I owe my own safety
to their faithfulness.”39 In gratitude, Mitchel promised military
protection to his slave allies, “who have given me valuable
assistance and information.” In May 1862, he wrote to Secretary
of War Edward M. Stanton requesting the “protection of my
government” for “slaves who furnish us valuable information.”
Like his subordinate, Mitchel affirmed that if his request
were disapproved, “it would be impossible for me to hold my
position.”40 Stanton endorsed the appeal. “The assistance of
slaves is an element of military strength which under proper
regulations you are fully justified in employing for your security
and the success of your operations,” Stanton replied, and to
abstain from its use “would be a failure to employ means to
suppress the Rebellion.”41
Mitchel corresponded with Stanton one month later
in defense of the slaves who assisted him. After reading a
republished letter in The Philadelphia Inquirer that caused him “to
fear that the Commanding General of the Army has returned
to their masters, Slaves, to whom I promised the permanent
protection of the Government of the United States,” Mitchel
wrote to Stanton attesting that these slaves “had rendered
valuable services, and had obtained for me most important
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information.” He begged for Stanton’s intervention on behalf
of these slaves, for “if they fall into the hands of their masters,
their lives will not be safe.”42 Assistant Secretary of War Peter H.
Watson responded to Mitchel’s panicked letter, avowing that the
newspaper’s statement had “no significant authority to sustain it”
and thus Mitchel’s promise to the slaves was upheld.43
At this pre-emancipation stage of the war, Mitchel’s
appreciation of slaves’ assistance to Union troops fighting in
the South was quite progressive. Even after January 1, 1863,
Union military officers baselessly differentiated between fugitive
slaves and outlined in a complex array the circumstances under
which they should and should not be welcome in Union camps.44
For example, Brigadier General Henry Hayes Lockwood, a
commander of volunteers in the lower Potomac, affirmed that
“military camps shall not be used as places of public resort or for
idlers” and all should be denied admittance except those providing
information. “Information will be sought for from all sources
and rewards in money,” Lockwood declared, “with protection
from danger from giving information may be promised to all,
White and Black.”45 There was, seemingly, a difference drawn
between accepting slaves as fugitives and accepting the integral
intelligence that they brought with them.
The value of military intelligence held by enslaved,
escaped, and freed African Americans became undeniably
apparent. “It is utterly impossible for us to subdue the rebels,
without an alliance with their slaves,” the Chicago Tribune detailed
in July 1862, as “we have everywhere been helpless without
these blacks, or exposed to hap-hazard.” The report recounted
numerous Union military blunders and claimed that “this
alliance with the slaves would have saved the precious, timewasting preparations.”46 Moreover, Union Colonel of the 1st
South Carolina Volunteers Thomas W. Higginson astutely noted
that slaves “have been spies all their lives.” “You cannot teach
them anything” with respect to clandestine activity, Higginson
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revealed, and “I should not attempt to give them instructions…
they would better be able to teach me.” Higginson realized that
slaves had practiced dissemblance and stealth throughout their
lives. Nearly from birth, they learned “to travel furtively at night,
to communicate surreptitiously, and to defend themselves”; they
already mastered the arts of masquerade, disguise, and forgery.47
Abraham Galloway was chief among them. At the
commencement of the war, he traveled to the Confederacy seeking
“to go South to incite insurrections.”48 Galloway joined Butler’s
command at Fortress Monroe in May 1861 and “possess[ed]
the fullest confidence of the commanding General.”49 In the
following two and a half years, Galloway deployed his covert
intelligence against the Confederacy from the Chesapeake Bay to
the Mississippi River, risking his life skirting slave patrols, enemy
scouts, and Confederate army units. Reporting directly to one
of the Union Army’s highest ranking field officers, Galloway
seemingly played a significant role in Union intelligence in
Virginia. In a letter to a colleague in the fall of 1863, Brigadier
General Edward A. Wild, a colonel in the Army of the Potomac,
succinctly noted Galloway’s service as a spy: “I would like to do
all I can for Galloway, who has served his country well.”50
Former slaves such as Galloway were uniquely suited to
operate behind enemy lines: they were familiar with southern
life, able to fade unobtrusively into local slave communities, and
conditioned to living by guile and by stealth. African Americans
utilized their local knowledge and their experience to guide Union
troops through the southern terrain. Accustomed to traveling
furtively between southern plantations, they “were as thoroughly
acclimated as the black snakes and alligators that bask in these
Southern waters.”51 Additionally, African Americans’ knowledge
of the physical geography was especially helpful to Union
soldiers. When two Northerners escaped from a Confederate
prison camp in Columbia, South Carolina, they chanced upon a
large plantation in Pickens District. The plantation’s slaves readily
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“provided information about the local terrain, the movement of
Confederate troops, the location of practical supplies, and the
presence of rebels and political sympathizers alike.” They also
advised the soldiers “to stop at the home of John W. Wilson,
a strong Union man.”52 Virtually everywhere Union soldiers
traveled, they encountered slaves such as these ready to provide
geographical information about the local terrain, the movement
of Confederate troops, the location of pickets and armaments,
and the presence of rebels and political sympathizers alike.
Additionally, slaves crafted maps of the South, consisting
of paths unknown to their masters. Such cartographic diagrams—
shared amongst slaves and with Union troops—illustrated “the
shortcuts and winding paths that crisscrossed the land and
plantation boundaries and led out into the woods, along which
people and goods moved clandestinely.”53 When W.L. Curry of
the 1st Ohio Cavalry was cut off from his command south of the
Tennessee River and was seeking safety, he met “a colored man
going to mill with a sack of corn on his back” who revealed that
he was only ten miles away from his destination. “He directed me
the way I should go,” Curry recalled, “and cautioned me to keep
away from public roads, as the country was full of rebel cavalry
and I was liable to be picked up at any moment.”54
Similarly, James Pike, a Texas-born white Union spy,
received vital assistance from slaves he encountered while
struggling to find his way back to his command in northern
Alabama in the late summer of 1862. Having spent the night
soaking wet after falling into a swamp, Pike chanced upon a
plantation, where he befriended the working slaves and sought
out their assistance. One young slave guided Pike away toward
Huntsville, Alabama. Pike recounted, “My guide seemed to be
perfectly at home in the swamp, and piloted the way for three
miles over a string of logs, which seemed to be arranged by
accident, and not design, so as to form a complete chain across
it, so that we were landed on the opposite side without wading a
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step.”55 Curry and Pike, astounded at the secret pathways that were
revealed to them, were lucky beneficiaries of slaves’ surreptitious
travel methods.56 Such instances affirmed that “contrabands”
provided “some of the most valuable information” regarding
the “position, movements, and plans of the enemy, use of
topography of the country.”57
African Americans’ greatest concealment was, naturally,
their skin color, which allowed them to observe, eavesdrop,
and carry back information to Union lines without suspicion.
“Slave cover” rendered African Americans “so ubiquitous” in
a southern household “that neither the table, the parlor, nor
the sleeping room has any secrets from them.” They “catch up
on everything that is said,” a Chicago Tribune reporter attested in
August 1861, and “their opportunities for getting information
are vastly better than those of the poorer class of whites…”58
William Robinson, a driver and house servant on a North Carolina
plantation, was “the kind of slave whose mobility and access
to white conversations provided him with valuable information
and the means to relay it.”59 Although he was illiterate, he
nonetheless outfoxed slaveholders by learning how to “listen
carefully to every conversation held between white people.”60
According to the Chicago Tribune, slaves such as Robinson “hung
about groups of whites,” their “countenances unutterably stolid,
or grinning with stupid indifference,” as if they neither heard
nor understood, yet actually retained and transmitted everything
said.61 In his autobiography, late nineteenth century black activist
Booker T. Washington recounted that slaves “got knowledge of
the results of great battles before the white people,” owing to
the clever machinations of the bondman assigned to pick up the
mail. “The man who was sent to the office would linger about
the place long enough to get the drift of the conversation from
the group of white people,” Washington revealed, and “the mailcarrier on his way back to our master’s house would as naturally
retail the news that he had secured among the slaves.”62 In these
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ways, slaves were constantly a step or two ahead of their masters.
Union military officials such as Lieutenant Colonel
Josiah Given, a commander of an Ohio regiment, benefited
from such covert activities. While stationed in Tennessee in
December 1862, Given received information from a slave named
Johnston, who arrived at his pickets and informed him “that he
overheard [a party of the southern cavalry] tell his master that
they were going to a certain point on the road from Shelbyville
to Fayetteville that night and would attack and capture a supply
train that was to pass there in the morning.” Acting upon this
information, Given sent two infantry companies, accompanied
by Johnston who served as a guide, to surround and to capture
the enemy. “They reported to me to have found everything just
as [Johnston] represented,” Given attested.”63 Simply by working
as human chattel within southern homes, slaves were capable of
utterly undercutting those who were fighting a war to keep them
in bondage.
“Slave cover” proved so effective for Union intelligence
that Sarah Emma Edmonds, a white northern woman, disguised
herself as an African American male to infiltrate the Confederacy,
crossing gender and racial lines. Edmonds “dyed her skin with
silver nitrate, donned a minstrel wig, and posed in a double
disguise as a man and an African American.”64 Playing the role
of a man named “Cuff,” she worked in Confederate kitchens
and ramparts, and collected information on troop figures,
fortifications, and morale. “Of one thing I am sure,” the Chicago
Tribune reported, “that the negroes, whose cunning and duplicity
are wonderful, have a pretty fair idea of what is going on, and
only await the word to work fearful mischief.”65
Beyond their own aptitude for clandestine activities,
African Americans advantageously exploited the ways in which
white men perceived black men and defined the American Civil
War. At the war’s onset, the majority of white men, northern
and southern, did not seriously consider African Americans
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part of the war effort.66 Historian Stephanie McCurry explains
that whites on both sides of the war viewed the conflict as the
“Brothers’ War,” meaning white man against white man, not one
in which slaves were included to participate. It was “the brothers
who brought it on in their (divided) capacity as the people,” she
explains, “and the brothers assumed it would be theirs to fight.”67
Despite being excluded from political life (i.e. citizenry), slaves
were counted, as labor, in the southern war effort; Confederate
white men believed firmly that slaves were one of the
Confederacy’s “most potent elements of strength.”68 McCurry
reveals that Confederates assumed adamantly that “the southern
negro ha[d] no sympathies with Northern abolitionists.”69 African
Americans could not seek out more than that kind of oblivion,
which allowed for their penetration of Confederate lands. Thus,
African Americans were capable of taking advantage of the
southern collective mindset that could not envision them as
agents actively undermining the Confederate war effort.
In fact, southern slaveholders entered the war confident
in their slaves’ devotion to the Confederacy. No master pondered
if his slaves would participate in the war, McCurry notes, as “racial
ideology provided all of the proof needed of slaves’ willingness
to serve the masters’ cause.”70 In his March 1861 “Cornerstone
Speech,” Confederate Vice President Stephens explained that
the Confederacy’s “foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests,
upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white
man; that slavery is his natural and moral condition.”71 Thus, the
Houston Telegraph declared, “if slavery is what we believe it to
be—the best form of society—it is not only fitted for peace but
for the exigencies of war.”72 Human bondage was not considered
a “necessary evil”—it was deemed a legitimate advantage to the
southern war effort.
Such racial ideology solidified slaveholders’ risky
undertaking. “One salutary result of the movement in favor of
Southern independence has been the awakening of Northern
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minds to the true relations existing between the negro and the
white man,” wrote a Louisiana editor in March 1861. “The idea
of the equality of race is a figment,” he maintained, as “the
negro is happiest” when in servitude.73 Accordingly, Chief of
the Confederate Bureau of War Albert T. Bledsoe affirmed
“that almost every slave would cheerfully aid his master in the
work of hurling back the fanatical invader.”74 “They would as
soon suspect their children of conspiring against their lives,” a
correspondent of the Charleston Mercury stated, affirming that
planters had absolutely nothing to fear regarding their slaves
in wartime.75 In fact, “many masters…have actually called their
slaves together and given them long pretended ‘explanations’
of the pending troubles,” the Chicago Tribune reported in August
1861, “and told them bug bear stones of what the Abolitionists
in ‘Old Abe’s’ army would do to them if they ever got them
in their clutches.”76 Thus, enslaved men and women were to be
entirely disposed depending upon their masters’ consent.77 Early
thoughts of slavery as an element of strength in the war rested
upon the baseless assumption that slaves would simply join the
southern effort.
As secessionists boasted about the advantages of
slavery to a republic at war, their slaves sought to undermine
directly that very notion. Nearly everywhere behind Confederate
lines, slaves attempted to be informed of military and political
developments, which, in a variety of ways, eroded the customary
masterly authority. According to Booker T. Washington, slaves
in the hills of western Virginia “watched…every success of the
Federal armies and every defeat of the Confederate forces…with
the keenest and most intense interest.”78 Indeed, a former slave
who lived in a remote section of east-central Texas divulged,
“during them times just like today nearly everybody knows what
going on” and that slaves helped “news travel pretty fast.”79
Major General Butler’s experience outwitting local
planters in New Orleans demonstrated slaves’ intimate knowledge
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of southern activities. Following his successful amphibious
assault on Hatteras Inlet in North Carolina in August 1861,
Butler traveled to New Orleans and took command of the city.
While attempting to bring order to the city, he implemented
“speedy and condign punishment” of southern offenders, which
fostered a prevailing belief “that nothing could be done there
that [he] could not find out.” It was supposed that Butler had
“the best spy system in the world.” That was quite true, yet not
in the way Confederates imagined. In early June 1862, Butler was
informed of a series of “sewing bees” taking place in the house
of a Confederate woman, where secessionist women gathered to
craft a flag to send to a Confederate New Orleans regiment. When
he confronted the ringleader, she instinctively denied his charges.
“General, you must be mistaken; you have been misinformed
as to the person,” she claimed. Butler retorted, “Madam, if I
were you I wouldn’t deny that which you know and I know. You
have had that flag made; it is finished and in your house; and I
should get it from there now, as I have seen fit to move about
it, if I had to take down your house from roof to hearth-stone.”
After revealing the flag, she asked Butler, “which of those girls
gave information about this flag?” as she was certain that “it was
not one of my servants.” “‘I have no objection to you secession
women eating each other like Kilkenny cats,” Butler replied, “but
you may accuse her unjustly. It may be your servants, which I
suppose you have.” She adamantly retorted, “No, it was not my
servants, General; that won’t do.” Butler later revealed in his
private writings that, in truth, “the negroes all came and told me
anything they thought I wanted to know.”80
A similar instance of surreptitious slaves emasculating
their ‘patriarchs’ was recorded in the diary of Julia LeGrand, the
daughter of a successful Louisiana planter and a New Orleans
resident.81 James Woodson, a slave of Jack Toney in Fluvanna
County, Virginia, escaped from his cruel master and reached
Union troops under the command of General Philip Sheridan,
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then raiding Virginia. The fugitive directed Union soldiers to
the home of his former employer and had his master tied up
and whipped as Woodson’s master had done to the former
slave countless times. Woodson then guided the Union soldiers
to abundant stores of armaments, which they took away or
destroyed on the spot.82 Such activities aggravated Southerners
and prompted them to further punish their slaves. Likewise,
the slaves on John Williams’s plantation in Helena, Arkansas,
exposed their master’s small supply of arms and ammunition.
Lieutenant M.H. David recalled, “When upon investigating his
‘negroes’, I ascertained that Williams had in his possession [guns
and rifles], which he had just denied saying he was an honest
man and did not have any use for arms, or ammunition…
consequently I had his house minutely searched…” David found
many guns, some of which were even hidden within his wife’s
belongings. Similar to Butler’s confession, David admitted, “The
‘negroes’ told me that [Williams] had [the arms and ammunition]
the night before…”83 Ultimately, masters least appreciated
being undermined. A Louisiana editor and slaveholder, John H.
Ramsdell characterized this best when he described his slaves
as “ungrateful and vindictive scoundrels who took possession
of their master’s property, pointed his place of refuge out to
the enemy, or voluntarily acted as guides to them in their
marauding overspreading of our country.”84 Yet, slaveholders
were helpless—the slaves were the enemy within.
The continuation of extensive black communication
networks formed during the antebellum period allowed
intelligence to travel over long distances, which further revealed
the limits of slaves’ supposed allegiance.85 “Somehow or other, by
some secret telegraph which cannot be detected, whatever one
learns is speedily communicated to the rest,” the Chicago Tribune
reported in August 1861.86 John Azor Kellogg, Colonel of the
6th Wisconsin Infantry Volunteer Regiment, found the slave
“telegraph line” in Georgia’s northeastern highlands particularly
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useful in reporting on military activity within the region. Kellogg
was so impressed with the information slaves provided that
he characterized slaves “as a class, better informed of passing
events and had a better idea of questions involved in the struggle
between North and South, than the majority of that class known
as the ‘poor white’ of the South.”87
George Washington Albright, born a slave but who
would later serve in the Mississippi State Senate as a free man
in the 1870s, revealed a far better coordinated network of
communication in Marshall County.88 “That was my first job in
the fight for the rights of my people,” he recalled, “to keep [slaves]
informed and in readiness to assist the Union armies whenever
the opportunity came.” Fifteen years old at the time, Albright
had been “a runner for what we called the 4-Ls—Lincoln’s Legal
Loyal League” and consequently, “traveled about the plantations
within a certain range and got together small meetings in the
cabins.”89 The South Carolina planter and politician James Henry
Hammond was certain that he could see the disconcerting results
of such communication networks “on all the negro faces” on
his plantation, Redcliffe, in late June 1863. Hammond took little
comfort in the “peculiar furtive glance with which they regard me
and a hanging off from me that I do not like.”90 Such complaints
resounded in the diaries and letters of numerous slaveholders
remaining at home or refuged at other sites, and testified to what
could be considered a “second front” opened by slaves within
the Confederacy.91
Masters’ knowledge of the lengths to which their slaves
went to assist the enemy obliterated their fictions of passivity and
loyalty. “It eventually registered at every level of the Confederate
regime, from the plantation to the high officials of central state
authority,” McCurry affirms, and spawned a series of significant
adjustments in the southern conduct of war. In August 1862,
slaves from Beaufort, South Carolina and Savannah, Georgia
arrived at Union lines carrying valuable information threatening
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the safety of local Confederate troops. Accordingly, southern
officers instructed to “make a reconnaissance up the country
around Summerville, South Carolina” due to the “disturbance
and alarm…caused by gangs of runaway negroes, leagued
with deserters in that neighborhood.”92 A few months later,
Confederate Colonel Lawrence Keitt confirmed the persistent
need for troops in coastal South Carolina to guard all of the
inlets along the coast. McCurry notes, “It was knowledge of
those kinds of inland waterways and the number and precise
position of Confederate troops, pickets, fortifications, and guns”
that slaves “conveyed in astonishing detail to federal forces in
Beaufort.”93 Thus, Keitt assigned more men, whom he could
not afford to relinquish from his own operations, to join the
“three cavalry companies…and two infantry companies” already
assigned to guard and patrol the coast.94 Keitt’s understanding
of vulnerable points of exit and entry along the coast of South
Carolina demonstrated the challenges slaveholders faced in
trying to keep the enemy out when there was another enemy to
guide them in.95
Similarly, in November 1862, a Confederate Major
Jeffords ordered the removal of the slaves of Mr. Warren, an
Ashepoo River planter, on “incontestable proof ” that they were
“in continual intercourse with the enemy” and thus endangered
his picket line. Jeffords’ commanding officer confirmed the truth
of the charges against local slaves. When he sent a scout “who
pretended to be a Yankee” to test “one or two negroes near the
enemy’s lines,” they provided him with “all the information an
enemy could desire in regard to position and strength of my
pickets.”96 Union naval men operating on the South Carolina
rivers relied on this type of intelligence to strategize and
plan their operations. “It is a matter of notoriety,” lamented
Confederate States District Attorney P.H. Aylett, “in sections of
the Confederacy where raids are frequent that the guides of the
enemy are nearly always free negroes and slaves.”97
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In an attempt to maintain southern order and prevent
slaves from assisting the Union, the Confederacy created
the “Twenty Negro Law” in October 1862, which provided
exemptions from military service to those who owned twenty
or more slaves.98 Among planters and state officials, the “Twenty
Nigger Law,” as white southerners called it, generated demands
to protect plantations and curtail escape to the enemy. In late
1863, near the town of Charlotte, North Carolina, a planter
requested a military exemption for his brother so that “order and
discipline” might be better maintained “in the neighborhood.”99
Women, who remained on plantations as their husbands served
in battle, also voiced their fears publicly, writing hundreds of
letters to state and Confederate officials imploring that men be
released from military service to control slaves. “I fear the blacks
more than I do the Yankees,” confessed Mrs. A. Ingraham of
Vicksburg, Mississippi. In Virginia, one woman observed that
living with slavery in wartime was like living “with enemies in
our own households.”100 The imperatives of controlling a restive
slave population strained relations within the Confederacy
and confirmed that slaves were, in fact, the Confederacy’s
“open enemies” who were “well calculated to do [the South]
immense injury.”101 The “Twenty Negro Law” was only the most
conspicuous political example of how slaves, the “second front,”
came to undermine the slaveholders’ republic.102
Having first been seen as an element of strength, slaves
unquestionably became the enemy within the Confederacy, as
they fled readily to Union lines and provided Union soldiers
with pertinent information. Thus, in January 1864, MajorGeneral Cleburne proposed to emancipate slaves to “enlist
their sympathies” in the Confederate cause, which blatantly
acknowledged slaves’ potent impact on southern society.
“Wherever slavery is once seriously disturbed, whether by
the actual presence or the approach of the enemy, or even by
a cavalry raid,” Cleburne recorded, “the whites can no longer
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Application submited by Confederate Private Lycurgas Rees in May 1864
for exemption from military service on the grounds of owning fifteen slaves, in
accordance with the terms established by the “Twenty Negro Law”
passed by the Congress of the Confederate States of America in October 1862
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with safety to their property only sympathize with our cause.”103
Slavery forced the Confederacy “to wage war with the Union
army in front and ‘an insurrection in the rear,’” becoming “in a
military point of view, one of our chief sources of weakness.”104
Despite the fact that both sides in the war starkly
recognized the clandestine activities of freed, enslaved, and
runaway African Americans, their legacies are fleeting in
historical memory. Cloaked in secrecy and often illiterate, African
Americans’ covert work is rarely recorded. “Not surprisingly,”
historian David S. Cecelski writes, “Galloway’s duties as a spy
consigned the details of his missions to the shadows.”105 Galloway,
Butler, and other Union officers whom the former slave assisted
were continually reticent about precisely where Galloway
traveled and what he did; they put little, if anything, into writing.
While Galloway occasionally alluded to his service as a spy in
postwar years, he never divulged the particulars of his covert
activities behind enemy lines.106 An excerpt of a later speech to
the Republican State Convention in Raleigh, North Carolina, in
September 1867, demonstrated Galloway’s oblique manner of
discussing his service as a Union spy: “I rendered good service
to this government—if I didn’t do it publicly, I did it privately.”107
In particular, how Galloway survived in the Deep South after
being captured at Vicksburg in 1862 and suddenly reappearing
at a Union camp in New Bern, North Carolina, in mid-1863
remains unknown. He was illiterate and never transcribed how
he managed to escape from a Confederate stockade or prison
camp in Mississippi and how he traversed from the heart of
the Confederacy back to New Bern.108 A later edition of the
newspaper Anglo-African proved the only exception, as it alluded
to Galloway being captured on the “distant Southern strand,”
but provided no further information.109 Most likely, Galloway
never fully revealed his experience as a captured Union spy in
Mississippi.110 His life as a slave, fugitive, and spy trained him
to take caution habitually, hardly provoking him to publicize his
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efforts.111
Like Galloway’s records, most military records of African
Americans’ covert activities are utterly incomplete.112 What remains
are military correspondences noting the assistance of “negroes,”
indistinctly termed together and devoid of any recorded identity.
Nonetheless, each and every “negro” undoubtedly shaped the
five-year conflict that resulted in a Union victory.
By April 1865, the reality was evident: the attempt to
build an independent slaveholding republic had failed. The
southern vision crumbled in the face of Union forces and the
heroic resistance of its own enslaved population. Rather than
furthering its own ideals, the Confederate war effort cemented
the destruction of slavery.113 The war itself highlighted that the
slaves’ “war within” was boundless, that they undermined the
Confederacy in ways unimaginable.114 The slaves proved, time
and again, their vast abilities to assist the Union Army and Union
Navy, so much so that by 1865, some Confederates even argued
for the eradication of slavery to ensure their own safety and the
survival of their own country.
The war itself produced the very conditions that enabled
African Americans to participate in northern clandestine
activities and become so detrimental to the southern cause—it
was precisely because of their exclusion from the political, and
thereby military, arena that allowed for their casual exploitation
of the Confederacy. Despite the fact that southern planters and
mistresses suspected and feared their slaves’ insurgent activities
throughout the war, African Americans continually participated
in covert activities throughout the five-year struggle. The war
transformed the society it sought to preserve.
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